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PLEASE DON’T FEED THE HOMELESS: POTTINGER REVISITED
By Shirley D. Howell*
In 1988, Miami’s homeless population filed a class action, Pottinger v. City of Miami,2 alleging that city officials acted in concert to deprive them of their civil rights.  While the Pottinger litigation was ongoing, Hurricane 
Andrew struck Miami, leaving 200,000 additional homeless in 
its wake3 and creating what the Pottinger court termed “a worst 
possible” scenario.4  It was the first time that a hurricane figured 
into homelessness litigation, and it is likely that the outcome of 
the case was in fact affected by the hurricane.  The court held 
Miami officials liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 the 
Eighth Amendment,6 the Fourth Amendment,7 the Due Process 
Clause,8 and the right to travel,9 perhaps in part because the trag-
edy of mass homelessness was showcased by Hurricane An-
drew.  In the face of so great a 
homeless population, the Court 
could not dismissively assume 
that people were homeless as a 
result of a perverse desire to be 
so, nor would it ignore the multi-
ple violations of their constitu-
tional rights. 
The similarities between the 
homelessness scenarios created by Hurricanes Andrew and 
Katrina are startling, each storm leaving behind an unassimi-
lated, newly homeless population to join the already burgeoning 
ranks of America’s homeless population.  While compassion has 
worn thin, evacuees have been ousted from temporary lodging.  
If adequate societal measures are not taken to house these evacu-
ees, they will be forced to live in the streets, parks, and under 
bridges, as were the Pottinger plaintiffs. 
This article will explore the relevance of Pottinger as the 
national homeless population rises to approximately five mil-
lion in the twenty first century.  Part I summarizes the demo-
graphics and causes of mass homelessness and addresses nega-
tive public reactions to the increased visibility of the homeless 
in major American cities.  Part II outlines and discusses the suc-
cessful causes of action brought by the homeless in Pottinger.
Part III concludes by setting forth proposals that would rein-
vigorate incentives to construct additional affordable housing, 
revisit America’s regressive tax schedule, and afford the home-
less suspect classification. 
OVERVIEW OF HOMELESSNESS BEFORE HURRICANE
KATRINA
In 2000, an estimated two million Americans were home-
less on any given night.10  Between 2.5 and 3.5 million Ameri-
cans experienced homelessness every year,11 and 30% of the 
homeless had been without homes for more than two years.12
These numbers do not include the indeterminate number of indi-
viduals who had no homes and were “doubled up”13 living with 
friends or relatives.  Only those persons “who lack a permanent 
address and sleep in places not designed to be sleeping accom-
modations for human beings... and those living in shelters”14
were considered homeless.  Thus, those living under the roofs of 
their families and friends did not meet the definition. 
Adult males constituted 44% of the homeless population 
before Hurricane Katrina.15  Women16 accompanied by minor 
children17 were the fastest growing segment of the chronically 
homeless18 and made up 36% of the homeless population.19
Some 750,000 children were homeless20 before Katrina and 1.5 
million elderly had “worst case housing needs.”21  Fifty percent 
of the homeless were African Americans, 35% White Ameri-
cans, 12% Latinos, 2% Native 
Americans, and 1% were Asian 
Americans.22  The causes of 
America’s rising homelessness 
rate have been debated for dec-
ades.  Some contend that per-
sonal deficiencies such as mental 
illness,23 substance abuse,24 in-
carceration,25 and an intergenera-
tional dependence upon welfare26 are the primary causes of 
homelessness.  Others cite macroeconomic factors such as loss 
of low-income housing,27 unemployment and underemploy-
ment,28 and a regressive tax structure.29 Notably, neither school 
of thought considers the impact of natural disasters. 
Years before Hurricane Katrina created the largest homeless 
population in American history, the public had developed 
“compassion fatigue” with homelessness.30  San Francisco en-
acted a series of ordinances through its so-called Matrix Pro-
gram to criminalize sleeping in a park, begging near a highway, 
or blocking a sidewalk.31  Eleven thousand of San Francisco’s 
poorest people were incarcerated as a result of the Matrix Pro-
gram.32  In Santa Anna, the homeless were rounded up, trans-
ported to a football stadium, physically marked with numbers, 
chained for hours, and ultimately released to a different loca-
tion.33  Massachusetts has imposed criminal sanctions upon 
those who “move about from place to place begging.”34  Ala-
bama has made it a criminal act to wander about “in a public 
place for the purpose of begging.”35
In response to increasing homelessness in 1984,36 during 
which thousands of individuals were sleeping in Bicentennial 
Park37 and other public venues, Miami police were directed “to 
identify food sources for the poor and to arrest and/or force an 
extraction of the undesirables from the area.”38  To keep the 
homeless moving and effectively “sanitize”39 the parks and 
streets, police were relentless in raiding the campsites of the 
homeless,40summarily destroying all on-site belongings.41 His-
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tory is repeating itself.  In July 2006, Las Vegas enacted an ordi-
nance to ban the giving of food to the homeless.42  A violation of 
the ordinance can be punished by a maximum fine of $1,000 and 
a jail term of up to six months.  
POTTINGER REVISITED
If America’s Post-Katrina response to the unprecedented 
surge of homelessness is to harass the homeless by jailing them 
or jailing those who feed homeless, the issues and remedies ad-
dressed in Pottinger become relevant again.  These issues and 
remedies are addressed below. 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The most sensitive issue in homelessness litigation concerns 
the voluntariness of the homeless defendant’s actions.  Purely 
involuntary acts cannot properly or morally be condemned as 
crimes under the Eighth Amendment.  To punish a person for 
his or her involuntary act would be cruel.43  The question then is 
whether a homeless person’s acts are voluntary.  A homeless 
person who commits rape cannot reasonably assert homeless-
ness as justification for the misdeeds.  In that case, status as a 
homeless person is irrelevant, and society cannot reasonably be 
expected to tolerate such behavior.  The question is more com-
plex when a homeless defendant with nowhere else to go is 
prosecuted for harmless acts such as sleeping in a park.  Is a 
public action “voluntary” when the homeless defendant must 
perform it to survive, and he has no private place in which to 
perform the action? 
The Pottinger court resolved the question by asking an-
other: is the defendant voluntarily homeless?44  If a defendant 
has voluntarily chosen to be homeless, he could be legally and 
morally deemed to have voluntarily assumed the risk of having 
to break the law to survive.  It is unreasonable for society to 
lower its expectation of public conduct in order to accommodate 
a private and voluntary choice of that character.  However, if the 
defendant’s homelessness is involuntary, a just society should 
not prosecute him for the indicia that attach to the fact of his or 
her homelessness.  The success of the Pottinger case rested in 
large part upon the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that they were 
suffering an involuntary45 state of homelessness and were com-
pelled to perform life-sustaining acts in public view.46
The United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. Califor-
nia47 held that a defendant could not be criminally punished for 
mere status as a drug addict, finding that a statute that made it 
punishable to be addicted to narcotics constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment.48  In Powell v. Texas,49 the Supreme Court 
addressed a similar issue of whether an alcoholic could be jailed 
for appearing drunk in public.50  The Court held that Powell had 
not been jailed for merely being addicted to alcohol, but for his 
active conduct of appearing in public in a drunken state.51 Pow-
ell is often cited by municipalities that arrest the homeless for 
the proposition that the homeless are not being punished for 
being homeless, but for their actions in violation of the law.  
Such arguments miss the point when the defendant is involuntar-
ily homeless.  The alcoholic, theoretically, can restrict his drink-
ing to his home and avoid punishment, but the homeless have no 
homes in which to perform what are usually private acts.52
Sleeping in parks, sitting on sidewalks, and begging are perfect 
examples.  To criminalize such actions when they are unavoid-
able is tantamount to prosecuting the homeless for existing, and 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments is impermissibly violated. 
The plaintiffs have historically borne the burden to establish 
that their public actions were, in fact, unavoidable.  In Pottinger,
the plaintiffs met that burden with statistical evidence and expert 
testimony.53  The plaintiffs offered irrefutable statistical evi-
dence of the severe shortage of beds in homeless shelters in Mi-
ami when they were arrested.54  The expert witnesses also testi-
fied that people seldom choose to be homeless.55  However, pub-
lic policy that requires the homeless to bear the burden of prov-
ing the voluntariness of their status is inherently flawed. 
The homeless, by definition, are persons with extremely 
limited resources, and they are not entitled to state-appointed 
attorneys in civil litigation in defense of their rights.  But for the 
pro bono advocacy of the American Civil Liberties Union,56 the 
Pottinger plaintiffs would have lacked the resources to amass 
statistics proving Miami’s shelters were inadequate to house the 
homeless population.  They also would not have been able to 
procure the experts57 who were pivotal in establishing that peo-
ple are seldom homeless by choice.58  The better public policy 
would allow the plaintiff to meet the burden of a prima facie 
case by establishing the actions committed by the state or mu-
nicipality in violation of his or her rights and the fact of his 
homelessness at the time of arrest.  The burden should then shift 
to the defendants to establish by a preponderance of evidence 
that the plaintiff is voluntarily homeless and thus, answerable 
for his or her public actions.  This policy would serve dual meri-
torious purposes: (i) to enhance the ability of the homeless 
plaintiff to find counsel who would accept his or her case, and 
(ii) to motivate states and their municipalities to cease efforts to 
harass the homeless out of their towns, and instead explore seri-
ous options for providing adequate affordable housing. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The homeless are gravely concerned about the conservation 
of those meager resources that they still have.  In Miami, the 
police frequently destroyed the on-site belongings of the home-
less59 as though the property were public rubbish.  In one par-
ticularly notorious raid, the Miami police handcuffed a group of 
homeless individuals, piled their clothing, medications, and a 
Bible together, and burned them while the homeless watched.60
The homeless contended that the police seized and destroyed 
their property without due process of law in direct violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.61
While a seizure of property occurs when there is a 
“meaningful interference” with an individual’s interest in that 
property,62 a seizure of property is unreasonable only if the 
state’s legitimate interests in the seizure do not outweigh the 
individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the object of the 
search.63  The question then is whether the plaintiffs have a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in personal property that may 
appear to others to be public rubbish.  Determining the nature of 
any legitimate expectation of privacy in personal property in-
volves two separate inquiries.  First, the court inquires whether 
the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the ob-
jects.64  Second, the court must determine whether that expecta-
tion is one that society should be prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable.65  If the homeless make efforts to protect their belong-
ings by attempting to shelter them from public view, stacking 
them in organized piles, or designating another homeless person 
to guard them, there is evidence of subjective expectation of 
privacy. 
The second inquiry is more difficult.  Should the public 
recognize the homeless person’s right to privacy when his or her 
property is littering the streets or public parks?  In Rakas v. Illi-
nois,66 the Supreme Court offered guidelines for determining the 
legitimacy of a plaintiff’s privacy interests.  As a trespasser or 
one who leaves property accessible to the public, the plaintiff 
may lose his or her privacy interests in the property; whereas 
one who is lawfully on property and shields it from public view 
may retain a subjective expectation in privacy that the public 
will recognize.  The term trespasser is turned on its head “when 
there is nowhere” private that a homeless person may lawfully 
be.67
         The Court has not specifically addressed the issue of 
whether a homeless person living outdoors has a privacy interest 
in their property that the public would find reasonable, but a 
Connecticut court has addressed the issue in part.  Based on so-
ciety’s established deferential treatment of closed containers, the 
court in State v. Mooney68  recognized a right of privacy in the 
closed duffel bags of the homeless. The court elaborated: 
[T]he interior of these items is, in effect, the 
defendant’s last shred of privacy from the pry-
ing eyes of outsiders, including the police.  
Our notions of custom and civility, and our 
code of values, would include some measure 
of respect for that shred of privacy, and would 
recognize it as reasonable under the circum-
stances of this case.69
Does a homeless person have a lesser interest in his clothing 
or medications because he has no duffel bag in which to enclose 
them?  From the perspective of the homeless, the answer is self-
evident.  However, municipalities also have a legitimate interest 
in the sanitation and safety of public spaces,70 which can be 
compromised by the accumulation of rubbish.  The Pottinger
court balanced the conflicting interests, holding that the home-
less had a legitimate expectation of privacy in their property, so 
long as the property did not create a public danger.71  The court 
held that the city was free to confiscate items such as mattresses 
with exposed springs because such items posed a clear danger.  
However, the court enjoined the destruction of non-harmful pos-
sessions such as Bibles, clothing, eyeglasses, medications, and 
personal identification, and declared such destruction a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.72
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Ordinances that prohibit the homeless from performing in-
nocent, necessary functions in public often fail for vagueness or 
overbreadth.  A statute is vague when it fails to give fair notice 
of the forbidden conduct.73  The Supreme Court held void va-
grancy ordinances in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville be-
cause the statutes did not give sufficiently clear notice of the 
behavior that was prohibited.74  Loitering statutes have suffered 
the same fate.  In 1983, the Supreme Court overturned Califor-
nia’s loitering statute that required citizens wandering the streets 
to produce identification upon a police officer’s request.75  Al-
though the homeless plaintiffs in Pottinger did not attack Mi-
ami’s ordinances on a vagueness theory, the plaintiffs did focus 
on the unconstitutional overbreadth of the ordinances when they 
were applied to innocent conduct of the homeless. 
A statute is overbroad when it reaches constitutionally pro-
tected conduct or conduct which is beyond the power of the state 
to regulate.76  A challenge based upon overbreadth will be up-
held if the enactment reaches “a substantial amount”77 of consti-
tutionally protected conduct.  Prior to Pottinger, there was no 
precedent for acts such as eating, sleeping, and sitting to enjoy 
constitutional protection, unless such acts could be characterized 
as expressive conduct.78  For the most part, however, when the 
homeless eat, sleep, and sit in public, they intend no expressive 
conduct.  They are performing those acts for the same reasons 
the housed perform them:  they are necessary to survival.  How-
ever, the Pottinger court held that when an involuntarily home-
less person performs such acts in public “at a time of day when 
there is no place they can lawfully be,”79 the statute becomes 
overbroad for punishing innocent conduct, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clause is impermissibly infringed.80
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
 The Supreme Court has recognized the right to travel as a 
fundamental right in Edwards v. California81 and reaffirmed it 
in Shapiro v. Thompson.82  In striking down a Connecticut stat-
ute denying public assistance to persons who had not been resi-
dents of the state for one year, the Shapiro decision reasoned 
that the statute discouraged travel by the poor by withholding 
benefits from those who would have otherwise qualified to re-
ceive them.83  In 1972, the Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital 
v. Maricopa County84 struck down a statute that conditioned 
free medical care upon a one-year residency requirement.85
This case is especially significant in homelessness cases because 
the Court specifically denounced the statute for denying indi-
gents “the basic necessities of life”86 and for the deterrent effect 
such statutes have on the rights of the poor to migrate.   
Because the right to travel is a fundamental right, statutes or 
ordinances infringing that right must be in furtherance of a com-
Spring 2007 17
18 THE MODERN AMERICAN
pelling state interest.87  They must also represent the least intru-
sive method for furthering those state interests.88  State interests 
such as maintaining public spaces in order to promote tourism, 
business, and developing inner-city downtown and park areas 
are not compelling interests.  The Supreme Court has held that 
such interests are substantial but not compelling.89  Further, the 
practice of arresting the homeless is not narrowly tailored to 
achieving the goals of promoting tourism or developing busi-
ness.  The involuntarily homeless arrested under such laws have 
no recourse but to return to their public lives upon their release 
from custody.  Thus, nothing is ultimately accomplished by the 
arrests.  If cities wish to promote their attractiveness to business 
and tourism, they must address both short-term and permanent 
housing for their homeless populations. 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In 1961, the Supreme Court reinvigorated civil rights pro-
tections that had largely remained dormant for some ninety 
years.  In Monroe v. Pape,90 the Court concluded that a party 
injured by the unconstitutional actions of police officers could 
recover damages in federal court under § 1983.  The police 
broke into the Monroe home, rousted them from bed, and ran-
sacked the house.91  Mr. Monroe was arrested, but was not al-
lowed to call his attorney and was not promptly arraigned.92
Monroe claimed that he suffered an unlawful search and seizure 
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment.93  He further claimed 
that his constitutional rights had been violated by the detention.  
Reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the claims against the 
police officers,94 the Supreme Court opined that police conduct 
may be actionable when it is in violation of constitutional rights. 
Municipalities may also be held liable for the actions of city 
officials when those officials act to execute a “policy or custom, 
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts 
may fairly be said to represent official policy.”95  In § 1983 liti-
gation, the homeless plaintiffs also bear the burden of establish-
ing that the actions were both persistent and widespread.96  Evi-
dence that the actions were isolated would be legally insufficient 
to warrant relief against the municipality,97 though the offending 
officers might remain liable for the actions. 
In Pottinger, discovery revealed internal memoranda that 
were “directed to high-ranking police department officials”98
regarding the need to oust the homeless from Miami’s public 
areas.  The persistent and widespread nature of the attacks on the 
homeless was a matter of public record.  Over 3,500 homeless 
individuals had been arrested in Miami when the suit was filed.  
The city could not escape liability under § 1983 for its acts of 
purposeful harassment of the homeless.99
EQUAL PROTECTION
In Harper v. State Board of Elections,100 the Supreme Court 
opined that “wealth, like race, creed, or color is not germane to 
one's ability to participate in the electoral process.  Lines drawn 
on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are tradi-
tionally disfavored.”101  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
declined every opportunity to grant the homeless the suspect 
classification that is afforded to other historically victimized 
groups.  This status is critical to the homeless population since 
only those state laws that discriminate against suspect groups are 
subjected to strict scrutiny102 and cannot stand unless the state 
demonstrates a compelling interest that is furthered by a nar-
rowly tailored policy.103
The Supreme Court has adopted the following criteria in its 
suspect-class analysis: (i) whether the disadvantaged class is 
defined by a trait that frequently bears no relationship to ability 
to contribute to society; (ii) whether the class has been saddled 
with unique disabilities because of prejudice and inaccurate 
stereotypes; and (iii) whether the trait defining the class is im-
mutable.104  The homeless can make a strong claim to a suspect 
or quasi-suspect class. 
The homeless are a class defined by their abject poverty, 
and that state of poverty frequently bears no relationship to an 
actual inability to contribute to society.  Many of the homeless 
have strong work histories105 and were rendered homeless by 
events beyond their control.106  One has only to review the acts 
perpetrated against the homeless in Miami and San Francisco to 
be persuaded of the dangerous prejudice of the public against 
the homeless. 
The last prong of analysis proves more challenging.  Do the 
homeless have defining, immutable characteristics?  If the term 
means literally “a characteristic that cannot be changed,” the 
homeless must fail in their attempts to achieve suspect classifi-
cation.  The judicial history of the term does not, however, sug-
gest so rigid a definition.  Aliens, who enjoy protection as a sus-
pect class, can become citizens, thereby changing their 
“immutable” characteristic.  Gender, which is protected, can be 
altered surgically, thus altering the gender characteristic.  By 
analogy, the mere fact that the homeless can again become 
housed does not alter the fact that, while one is in fact homeless, 
it is physically apparent to society. 
The Supreme Court in Lyng107 adopted a broader interpreta-
tion of immutability, including an inquiry as to whether the class 
members “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing charac-
teristics that define them as a discrete group.”108 The homeless 
have glaringly distinguishing characteristics: they reside under 
bridges, sleep in parks, shelters and other public places, and they 
beg. 
POTTINGER’S IMPACT
Litigation in Pottinger spanned a decade.  Ultimately, the 
court enjoined the city of Miami from arresting its homeless so 
long as they ere not engaged in conduct harmful to others or 
themselves.109  Miami was ordered to establish “safe zones”110
in areas where the homeless could access food programs and 
health services.  The parties ultimately negotiated a financial 
settlement for the homeless plaintiffs.111
The impact of the case was immediate.  Both the city of 
Miami and other private entities constructed shelters for the 
homeless while the case was on appeal.112  As word spread 
about the decision in Miami, other cities took stock of their own 
practices.  Fort Lauderdale, Florida stopped its “bum sweeps”113
and began encouraging its officers to refer the homeless to so-
cial services in lieu of making arrests.114
CONCLUSION
As America’s homeless population reaches five million 
after Hurricane Katrina, Pottinger-type abuses such as those in 
Las Vegas are to be anticipated unless society becomes pro-
active.  Congress must reinforce incentives for constructing af-
fordable housing and raise the minimum wage.  Meanwhile, 
“safe areas” must be available to those who have nowhere else 
to go, and human resources must be provided to patrol those 
areas to protect homeless men, women, and children from the 
violence of the streets. 
As America’s most vulnerable population, the homeless 
must be afforded a “suspect class” designation.  They are easily 
identified and despised for characteristics they cannot readily 
change.  They have suffered the deprivation of the most funda-
mental rights because their very existence frightens the greater 
population on a visceral level.  The goal, however, is not only to 
place the homeless in a better position to defend their constitu-
tional rights, but to create a society that rejects “compassion 
fatigue” in favor of indefatigable compassion and commit-
ment115 to the welfare of even its poorest citizen. 
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